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APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
I.

INTRODUCTION

In prior briefing, Scott Patterson argued that his postconviction claims
should be considered despite the State’s arguments they were untimely. First,
he presented several arguments why the court should reach the merits of his
claims, even under the statute of limitations in the Postconviction Remedies
Act (PCRA). But if the claims really were untimely under the PCRA, he
argued they should be heard under the Utah courts’ extraordinary writ power.
This Court has ordered supplemental briefing on the constitutional
argument. The briefing order directs the parties to address a variety of
questions, but the core issues are these: what is the breadth of the Utah courts’
writ power, and what power does the Legislature have to regulate it?
Mr. Patterson shows below that the courts’ writ power includes the
power to grant postconviction relief. That power was granted at Utah’s
founding and was reaffirmed in the 1984 amendments to the Judicial Article.
Mr. Patterson also shows below that the Legislature’s power to regulate
the writ power is minimal. At Utah’s founding, the Legislature exercised the
power to create rules of procedure, which allowed it some control in how the
courts used the extraordinary writs. Over the years, the power to create rules
was gradually shifted to this Court. In 1984, that shift was constitutionalized,
and now this Court has the power to promulgate rules of procedure, subject to
the Legislature’s power to amend by supermajority. Because the PCRA cannot
1

be considered an exercise of the Legislature’s rulemaking authority, it does not
limit the courts’ ability to grant postconviction relief via their writ powers.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The 1984 revisions to the Judicial Article provide Utah courts with
the power to grant postconviction relief.
It response to Mr. Patterson’s argument that Utah courts have the power

to grant postconviction relief through their writ power, the supplemental
briefing order asks a series of questions that seek to elucidate that position.
While all facets of those questions are important, one key question guides the
resolution of the rest: whether this Court should focus its analysis on the
understanding of the courts’ writ power in 1984 or 1896. 1
The answer is simple. The focus must be on the 1984 understanding.
While undoubtedly relevant, the 1896 writ provisions are no longer in effect.
The 1984 amendments are now the governing law.
That leads to the next question: what was the impact of the 1984
amendments? The historical record answers that when the people of Utah
ratified the 1984 amendments on the courts’ writ power, they understood them
to ratify the status quo. And, further answering this Court’s questions, Mr.

Although the supplemental briefing order focuses on this Court’s writ
power, Mr. Patterson’s analysis extends to the power held by the district courts
and the other, statutory courts, as all have been granted the same writ power.
Compare Utah Const. art. VIII, sec. 3 & 5 with Utah Code § 78A-4-103(1)
(granting extraordinary writ powers to Court of Appeals); Utah Code § 78A-7105(4) (same to justice courts); see also Utah Code § 78A-6-102(3) (declaring
juvenile courts as equal in status with district courts).
1

2

Patterson can demonstrate that by 1984, Utah courts had long been granting
postconviction relief under the authority of their writ power. Moreover, such
use of the writ power was consistent with the original grant of writ power in
1896 constitution.
1.

The 1984 Judicial Article amendments aimed to preserve the courts’
writ powers.

Prior to 1984, the Judicial Article saw little change, other than a little
tinkering in the 1940s and the 1960s. But a confluence of factors in 1970s and
early 1980s led to a push for a complete overhaul of the Judicial Article.
One factor that led to the amendment push was the “alarming growth in
the Supreme Court caseload.” Cheryll L. May, Utah Judicial Counsel History at
15 (Mar. 1998). Efforts to create an intermediary appellate court were
confounded by the constitution’s guarantee that “[f]rom all final judgments of
the District Courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.”
Utah Const. art. VIII, sec. 9 (1896). Another factor was the fragmented nature
of the courts that prevented system-wide administration. Rather than one
person or body having authority over the whole court system, there was instead
a “hydra-headed system” of leadership. See Utah Judicial Counsel History at 15.
Another push came from fights between the executive and legislative branches
on how judges should be selected. See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah
1982); Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 240 (Utah 1982) (per curiam).
Because of these and other issues, the Constitutional Revision
Commission (CRC) undertook a comprehensive review of the Judicial Article
so that these problems could be addressed. 1984 CRC Report at 15–17. In
3

proposing changes, one of the CRC’s primary objectives was “to articulate the
role of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government within the historical
framework of the system of checks and balances.” CRC Report at 15.
Ultimately the CRC recommended a completely new Judicial Article.
Some sections were tossed out as unnecessary, others looked little they did
before, and new provisions were created from scratch. See Addendum B, CRC
Report at 19–41 (providing a comparative and section-by-section analysis).
But for the provisions delineating the courts’ writ power, the only change
was terminology. Decades before 1984, court rules had simplified the use of
the extraordinary writs, abolishing the need for special pleadings. Instead, a
petitioner needed only to ask for relief by extraordinary writ. “[N]evertheless
the remedy remains the same as when names were important.” See State v.
Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 970 (Utah 1967) (discussing former URCP 65B). With
the 1984 amendments, this “simplification of the writ process” was
constitutionalized. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 10, 127 P.3d 682. The
CRC report explained the change this way: “The original jurisdiction to issue
extraordinary writs has been retained, but is written in more general language
than that found in the present [1896] provision.” CRC Report at 26. A similar
change was recommended for the article covering district courts. Id. at 28.
These changes were not controversial. The Legislature did not alter the
CRC’s recommendations in the joint resolution that sent the proposed
amendments to the people of Utah for ratification. See Judicial Article
Revision, 1984 Utah Laws 2d spec. sess. 268, 269 (“S.J.R. 1, passed March 27,
1984). There was similar quiet on the issue in the voter information pamphlet.
4

The subject of writs, extraordinary or otherwise, was not mentioned in the
impartial analysis section, nor in the arguments for or against the revision. See
1984 Utah Voter Information Pamphlet at 14–20.
Consistent with the CRC’s description of the change, and consistent with
prior practice under court rules, this Court has repeatedly explained that the
1984 amendments did not affect its power to issue “the specific writs
mentioned in the original version of Article VIII.” Petersen v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah 1995); accord Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶¶ 10–11;
Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995); Hurst v. Cook,
777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989); Heninger v. Ninth Cir. Ct., State of Utah,
Washington County, 739 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Utah 1987).
2.

The 1896 Constitution provided courts with the power to grant
postconviction relief from convictions and sentences.

Because the 1984 amendments did not alter the courts’ writ powers,
those powers must be at least as extensive as they were under the original
provisions in the 1896 Constitution. The original provisions serve as a baseline.
While the text of the 1896 Constitution explicitly gave the courts habeas
power, it did not define the breadth of that power. So, to resolve the issue, it is
necessary to look at the “original meaning” of that grant of power. See Neese v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 67, 416 P.3d 663. And to
determine original meaning, it is necessary to ask “what principles a fluent
speaker of the framers’ English would have understood a particular
constitutional provision to embody.” Id. at ¶ 96.

5

To determine the original meaning of the Utah Constitution, we must
determine how the Utahns would have understood its provisions when they
were asked to vote for its ratification. As in 1984, the grant of habeas power
and writ power generally was not controversial or even remarkable.
Consequently, there are no debates or such that reveal what the public
understanding was at the time. Instead, we must look to how the habeas power
was used prior to 1896 to see how its use informed the public understanding.
Cf. Waite v. Utah Labor Commission, 2017 UT 86, ¶¶ 64–85, 416 P.3d 635 (Lee, J.,
concurring) (surveying how the Open Courts Clause was used in other state
constitutions to determine original meaning). That view shows that the original
meaning of the habeas power included the power to grant postconviction relief.
a. Pre-ratification evidence of original meaning
As an initial matter, many Utahns who settled the territory would have
arrived with broad conception of the habeas power. Before Mormons came to
Utah, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was headquartered in
Nauvoo, Illinois. John S. Dinger, “Joseph Smith and the Development of
Habeas Corpus in Nauvoo, 1841–44,” 36 Journal of Mormon History 136–38
(2010). When the Illinois legislature charted the city in 1840, it included a
then-unusual provision: it gave the municipal court the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus. Id. at 138–41. Based on that grant of power, the city council of
Nauvoo passed habeas corpus ordinances that allowed the city’s municipal
court “to review not only the legality of the arresting writ but the underlying
crime for which the arrest was made regardless of the state in which it
6

happened.” Id.at 136. This meant the municipal court could use its habeas
power not only to ensure that an arrest warrant was procedurally proper, but it
could also try the crime itself before allowing the warrant to be executed. Id. at
146–47. This power to review the legality of an accusation before the case was
even tried was unprecedented for the time, and its existence in Nauvoo
supports the view that early Utahns would have understood habeas authority
as asking more than just whether a court had jurisdiction.
At Utah’s founding, the public understanding of the habeas power also
was informed by how habeas was used in other states. In some states, Utahns
saw the habeas power successfully used in the postconviction setting. For
example, in one Nevada case, a petitioner was granted relief from his
conviction because the tax law he violated was invalid. The Supreme Court of
Nevada ruled in his favor despite objections that it was improper to consider
the petitioner’s claim under habeas. See Ex parte Rosenblatt, 14 P. 298, 298–99
(Nev. 1887). Similarly, the Supreme Court of California granted habeas relief
to a petitioner who had been convicted of violating a city ordinance. It
concluded that habeas relief was appropriate because, in its interpretation of
the ordinance, “the petitioner was tried and sentenced to be punished for the
commission of an act which is and under the existing laws can be no crime.”
See Ex parte Kearny, 55 Cal. 212, 225–29 (1880).
As described in Mr. Patterson’s prior briefing, the greatest indicator of
how early Utahns would have understood the habeas power comes through the
way it was used to vindicate the constitutional rights of Lorenzo Snow, a
prominent leader (and later President) of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter7

day Saints. To appreciate the significance of his case, it is first necessary to
review Utah’s territorial history.
After Utah was made a territory, Congress made ever-increasing efforts
to eradicate polygamy. The first push came with the Morrill Act, which made it
an offense punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment to “marry any other
person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States.” Morrill
Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862); Edwin Firmage and Richard Mangrum, Zion
in the Courts, 131 (Univ. Ill. Press 2001) [hereinafter “Zion in the Courts”]. But
the law was difficult to enforce. For one thing, the Utah territory, like the
territories around it, did not keep marriage records. Zion in the Courts, 149.
More significantly, “Mormon weddings were often performed in temples or the
Endowment House, which were open only to faithful Mormons,” so willing
witnesses were hard to find. Id. Altogether these conditions made it difficult to
prosecute polygamist marriages. Id. at 160.
In response to these troubles, Congress passed the Edmunds Act, which
created the new offense of “unlawful cohabitation.” Id. at 161; Edmunds Act,
ch. 47, 22 Stat. 31, §3 (1882). This created a new misdemeanor, punishable by
up to six months in prison, that prohibited “cohabit[ing] with more than one
woman.” Id. This statute eliminated the need to prove that sexual intercourse
had occurred or even that some marriage ceremony had occurred. It was
enough that a man had been “living and dwelling with more than one woman
as if they were married.” United State v. Cannon, 7 P. 369, 374-75 (Utah 1885).
While the new offense was easier to prosecute, the six-month penalty did
not have much bite. But that did not stop creative prosecutors. To increase a
8

defendant’s punishment, prosecutors would bring a separate charge of
cohabitation for discrete time periods, e.g., charging a defendant separately for
each year, month, or even each day in violation. Zion in the Courts, 178-79.
The first test case for this charging practice came in the prosecution of
Lorenzo Snow. In December 1885, he was charged in three separate
indictments with unlawful cohabitation with the same women—one charge for
the year 1883, another for 1884, and one for 1885. He was first tried on the
1885 charge and convicted. At his second trial, for the charge covering 1884, he
argued that his prior conviction barred further prosecution. The district court
rejected his defense in that trial and again at his third trial for the charge
covering 1883. Zion in the Courts, 179.
Mr. Snow appealed all three convictions. See United States v. Snow, 9 P.
501 (Utah 1886); 9 P. 686 (Utah 1886); 9 P. 697 (Utah 1886). Only the second
appeal discusses his prior-conviction defense. This Court’s territorial
predecessor recognized the issue as “probably the most important in the case”
but believed there was not “an abundance of authority either for or against”
Mr. Snow’s contention that he was improperly charged. Snow, 9 P. at 693.
Ultimately, though, it was persuaded that the separate charges were permissible
and upheld the convictions. Id. at 696.
Mr. Snow appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but his request was
denied. Under the statutes then in effect, Congress had not granted the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review criminal proceedings by appeal or writ of
error. And for that reason, Mr. Snow’s writs of error were dismissed. Snow v.
United States, 118 U.S. 346, 347-54 (1886). In the course of the decision,
9

though, the Court twice mentioned that it could consider an appeal of decision
denying habeas relief. Id. at 348-49.
Taking the hint, Mr. Snow’s next move was to seek relief via habeas. On
October 22, 1886, his attorney, Franklin S. Richards, 2 filed his petition in the
territorial court. It alleged that Mr. Snow was “being punished twice for one
and same offense,” and asked to be released on that ground. “Petition of
Habeas Corpus,” Deseret Evening News (Oct. 22, 1886). The territorial district
denied the petition. “Writ Denied,” Deseret News (Oct. 27, 1886).
Mr. Snow appealed the denial to the U.S. Supreme Court. Ex parte Snow,
120 U.S. 274, 280 (1887). On appeal, the government argued that Mr. Snow
was not entitled to relief in habeas proceedings because he was not raising
jurisdictional issues but issues of statutory interpretation. Id. at 281.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Jumping to the heart of the
matter, it determined the territorial supreme court had incorrectly interpreted
the cohabitation statute: it defined a continuing offense, not one that could be
divided up arbitrarily. Id. at 281-85. Based on this interpretation of the statute,
the Supreme Court concluded the district court in the criminal proceeding had
“no jurisdiction to inflict a punishment” for duplicitous charges. Id. at 285. The
conviction and sentence were “illegal,” and it was proper to give Mr. Snow
habeas relief. Id. at 285-87. Though framed as a ruling of jurisdiction, the Snow

More details about Mr. Richard’s background and his participation in
Mr. Snow’s case is available in this article: Ken Driggs, “‘Lawyers of Their
Own to Defend Them’: The Legal Career of Franklin Snyder Richards,” 21
Journal of Mormon History 84 (1995).
2

10

decision is readily seen as a ruling based on the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
This broad view of habeas was confirmed in another Utah case that
came to the U.S. Supreme Court two years later. That case, Ex parte Nielson,
again involved the propriety of multiple charges. After the Snow decision,
prosecutors could charge cohabitation only once, so instead they charged the
defendant Hans Nielson with cohabitation and adultery. Ex parte Nielson, 131
U.S. 176, 176–77 (1889). He was tried on the cohabitation charge first, and
pleaded guilty. When he was arraigned on the adultery charge, he entered a
plea of former conviction, arguing that the cohabitation and adultery charges
were “one and the same offense and not divisible.” Id. at 177–78. The
prosecutor demurred to the plea, which the district court sustained.
Mr. Nielson was subsequently convicted and sentenced to additional
imprisonment. Id. at 178.
Mr. Nielson did not appeal at all. Instead, within days of sentencing, he
filed a habeas petition arguing that “he was being punished twice for one and
the same offense,” so “the court had no jurisdiction to pass judgment against
him upon more than one of the indictments.” Id. When the district court
denied his petition, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
The Supreme Court again rejected the government’s argument that it
was improper to grant habeas relief based on Mr. Nielson’s arguments. While
the Court acknowledged that habeas could not serve the role of an appeal, that
did not mean that all claims were barred. By then, the Court had already held
that a statute’s constitutionality could be challenged on collateral review
11

because if a statute was unconstitutional, it would deprive a court of
jurisdiction to hear a charge under the statute. Id. at 182–83 (citing Ex parte
Coy, 127 U. S. 731 (1888)). From this, the Supreme Court reasoned:
It is difficult to see why a conviction and punishment under
an unconstitutional law is more violative of a person’s
constitutional rights than an unconstitutional conviction
and punishment under a valid law. In the first case, it is
true, the court has no authority to take cognizance of the
case; but in the other it has no authority to render judgment
against the defendant.
Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added). In light of its later conclusion that the two
crimes were one and the same offense, the Supreme Court held that Mr.
Nielson’s sentence on the adultery conviction “was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, because it was against an express provision of the constitution which
bounds and limits all jurisdiction.” Id. at 185.
As with Snow, Nielson was nominally decided as a matter of jurisdiction.
But to the general public, the understanding was the same: habeas corpus
allowed courts to grant postconviction relief based on constitutional defects.
Consistent with that understanding, a respected treatise on jurisdiction from
this period declared:
[I]f the defendant being placed on trial was denied the right
of counsel guarantied him by the constitution there is no
rightful conviction for he has had no trial and the
conviction only follows a trial. So if a defendant was
refused a subpoena for witnesses in his favor or refused the
right of having the indictment read to him or any
constitutional immunity the sentence is void. Such
immunities are part of the mode of trial and their refusal
goes to the power of the court as much as if sentenced without
being indicted at all.
12

BROWN ON JURISDICTION, §103 (“When judgment is void and when voidable”)
(pp. 280-81) (1891) (emphasis added).3
In cannot be doubted that these two cases left an impression on the
people of Utah. As the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, article
after article followed. The Deseret News criticized the district court for failing
to issue the writ at all, even if just to deny it. It worried that this might frustrate
review by the Supreme Court. “Another Judicial Straw,” Deseret News (Nov. 3,
1886). 4 A later editorial in the Deseret Evening News advised readers that they
must exercise “a little more patience” as they waited for the Supreme Court to
hear the appeal. “The Snow Habeas Corpus Case,” Deseret Evening News (Nov.
26, 1886). When Mr. Snow’s attorney, F. S. Richards, left Utah to argue the
case, it was reported. “A Very Important Case,” Deseret Evening News, (Dec. 27,
1886). And after the case was argued, the Deseret Evening News provided a
lengthy discussion of the argument itself. “Law and Logic: Arguments in the
Case of Lorenzo Snow,” Deseret Evening News (January 29, 1887).
Once the case was decided, news of it made it into every newspaper. A
short discussion of the result was announced on the day the decision it was
A scan of the treatise is available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=E5gEAAAAYAAJ. The second edition
of this treatise was issued in 1901. It gives the same view on habeas and
jurisdiction. See BROWN ON JURISDICTION, §103 (pp. 378-79) (1901), available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=nKYzAQAAMAAJ. This Court
frequently relied on this treatise. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 140 P. 218, 220 (Utah
1914); Snyder v. Pike, 83 P. 692, 694 (Utah 1905).
3

4

The historical articles are in Addendum A in chronological order.
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issued. “Reversed!,” Deseret Evening News (Feb. 7, 1887); “The Decision,” Ogden
Herald, (Feb. 7, 1887). The next day just about every paper discussed it. See
“The Great Topic,” Ogden Herald (Feb. 8, 1887); “A Paralyzer,” Salt Lake HeraldRepublican (Feb. 8, 1887); “The Snow Case,” Salt Lake Democrat (Feb. 8, 1887);
“The Snow Decision,” Salt Lake Tribune (Feb. 8, 1887). Further discussion of
the decision and its consequences followed in the weeks after. See, e.g.,
“Releasing the Cohabs,” Salt Lake Tribune (Feb. 10, 1887);5 “The Last Assault
on Mr. Dickson,” Salt Lake Tribune (Feb. 12, 1887); “In the Snow Case,” Salt
Lake Herald-Republican (Feb. 13, 1887); “The Scope of the Decision,” Deseret
News (Feb. 16, 1887). Eventually, papers printed the Supreme Court’s decision
in full. See, e.g., “The Snow Case,” Salt Lake Herald-Republican (Feb. 18, 1887).
The subsequent habeas proceedings for Mr. Nielson made smaller waves,
but they were still well-covered. Like Mr. Snow, Mr. Nielson was represented
by Franklin S. Richards. His departure to D.C. to argue the case was
announced. “Gone to Washington,” Utah Enquirer (Mar. 29, 1889). The
briefing in Mr. Nielson’s Supreme Court case was described for the public. See,
e.g., “The Nielson Case: Before the U.S. Supreme Court,” Utah Enquirer (Apr.
30, 1889). The public also received a description of the oral argument. “The
Neilsen [sic] Case,” Deseret Weekly (May 18, 1889). And once the Supreme
Court was announced, its decision was widely discussed. See “Only One

The Tribune’s coverage in this article and elsewhere is particularly
notable in light of the paper’s generally hostile stance towards Mr. Snow and
the Mormon church in this era. While it was critical of many things, it never
suggested the Supreme Court misused the habeas power.
5
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Punishment,” Ogden Semi-Weekly Standard (May 14, 1889); “The Nielsen
Case,” Utah Enquirer (May 17, 1889); “An Erroneous Impression,” Utah
Enquirer (May 20, 1889).
The Snow and Nielson cases where both items of general interest in the
community. When Utahns were asked to ratify the state constitution, these
cases would have informed their understanding of the grants of habeas power
in that constitution. And based on these cases, Utahns would have understood
the habeas power to include the power to grant postconviction relief.
b. Post-ratification evidence of original meaning
After ratification, there were a number of decisions from this Court
confirming that the habeas corpus provisions were originally understood to
include the power to grant postconviction relief.
One of the earliest postconviction cases in state history was In re McKee.
McKee challenged his conviction by an eight-person jury, an “innovative”
feature of state’s nascent criminal justice system. He claimed that the use of
the eight-person jury denied him due process. In re McKee, 57 P. 23, 23–24
(Utah 1899). This Court denied habeas relief, but not because the writ could
not reach such claims. Instead, it ruled on the merits, finding no conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 24–28. Similarly, in an appeal from a habeas
denial, the petitioner argued that his conviction was invalid because the statute
under which he was prosecuted was unconstitutional. Bruce v. Sharp, 127 P.
343, 344 (Utah 1912). The petitioner lost his appeal, but again the decision was
based on the merits, not because this use of the writ was improper. Id.
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Perhaps the earliest postconviction habeas success recorded in the
appellate reports was Saville v. Corless.6 The petitioners argued that the statute
under which they were convicted was invalid because “the subject of the act is
not clearly expressed in the title, and that the act contravenes the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the state
Constitution, forbidding special legislation where a general law can be made
applicable.” 151 P. 51, 51 (Utah 1915). This Court granted relief and accepted
all three petitioners’ arguments. Id. at 51–53.
There is no reason to believe that the justices who decided these cases
misunderstood the habeas power they wielded. These cases were all decided in
the shadow of ratification. Moreover, these justices were not strangers to Utah.
For example, of the justices who decided In re McKee, two (Justice Miner and
Justice Bartch) served as territorial federal judges before the state was
incorporated. See, e.g., Clifford L. Ashton, The Federal Judiciary in Utah 49–
51 (Utah Bar Foundation 1988). The third (Justice Baskin) was a long-time
lawyer and former mayor of Salt Lake City. See, e.g., Eileen Hallet Stone,
“Living History: Robert Newton Baskin fought Utah’s fusion of church and
state,” S.L. Tribune (May 23, 2014). And while they were not delegates to the
state’s constitutional convention, all three were mentioned during the general

In 1908 that this Court first made clear that the State could appeal a
decision granting habeas relief. See Winnovich, 93 P. at 991–92. This may
explain why postconviction successes do not appear in earlier state decisions.
6
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proceedings. 1 & 2 Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention 672, 1400, 1747, 1768.
When Utahns ratified the constitution, they understood it to include a
grant of habeas power to the state courts that allowed for postconviction relief.
This Court then used that power in early cases.
3.

The 1984 amendments enshrined the courts’ existing authority to issue
extraordinary writs, which included postconviction relief.

As discussed above, all available evidence shows that when the Utah
Constitution was amended in 1984, the people of Utah sought to preserve for
the courts the same power to issue the writs that the courts had been exercising
under the original provisions. And by the time of the 1984 amendments, it was
well understood that the courts’ writ power extended to postconviction
challenges. This is reflected in how habeas was used over the years.
In early Utah habeas cases, the focus was nominally on jurisdiction. The
writ would not issue if a person was detained under the order of a court
exercising proper jurisdiction. See, e.g., See Winnovich v. Emery, 93 P. 988, 99394 (Utah 1908). But this did not mean that habeas courts would not reach
constitutional claims. As discussed above, courts granted relief based on the
theory that the constitutional violation deprived the courts of jurisdiction to
enter a judgment against the petitioner. See Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S. at 285–87;
Ex parte Nielson, 131 U.S. at 183–84; Saville, 151 P. at 51–53.
By the 1940s, this Court tossed out this formulistic scheme. Instead, it
recognized that habeas corpus could be used for “the correction of
jurisdictional errors and [for] errors so gross as to in effect deprive the
17

defendant of his constitutional substantive or procedural rights. . . . And this of
course is true whether the constitutional right is granted by the State
Constitution or by the Federal Constitution through absorption in the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Thompson v. Harris, 152 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah 1944).
From then on, this Court was explicit in its position that habeas corpus was
not concerned only with jurisdiction, but could reach any error of sufficient
magnitude. Relying on nothing but its constitutional powers, this Court
granted habeas relief for decades until the 1984 amendments.
This subsequent history must be considered in understanding the original
meaning of the 1984 amendments. The alternative is untenable. By the time of
the amendments, Utah courts had been considering postconviction claims and
granting postconviction relief for decades. For years, this Court had been
regulating the postconviction process by rule. See, e.g., URCP 65B(i) (1969).
Given that background, it would make no sense to say that both the Utah
Legislature and the people of Utah were dissatisfied with how this Court had
interpreted the grant of writ powers, but nevertheless went ahead with an
overhaul of the Judicial Article without restricting this Court’s use of that
power. Nor is there any reason to believe the people of Utah understood the
writ power to be something other than what this Court said it was. So, to
determine the public meaning of the 1984 provisions granting Utah courts the
power to issue extraordinary writs, it is necessary to examine how the writ
power was used since the founding in 1896, and especially on the eve of when
the amendments were made.
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This conclusion is consistent with how the U.S. Supreme Court has
handled similar constitutional issues. In McDonald v. Chicago, for example, the
question presented was whether the rights protected by the Second
Amendment were incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 561 U.S. 742, 749–50, 752–53 (2010). In deciding that question,
the Supreme Court considered not only the original meaning of the Second
Amendment, but also its public meaning at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. See id. at 767–78 (“In sum, it is clear that the Framers
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear
arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered
liberty.”) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court took the same approach in
Timbs v. Indiana. In that case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the
Excessive Fines Clause was incorporated against the states. 139 S.Ct. 682, 686–
87 (2019). Again, the Court considered the meaning of that clause at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Id. at 688–89.
Sure, the mechanics here are little different, but they are more direct.
Rather than incorporating existing constitutional provisions, as then
understood, against different sovereigns, the amendments to the Judicial
Article incorporated existing constitutional provisions, as then understood,
against the same sovereign. So, to understand what Utahns accomplished
when they ratified the Judicial Article, we must determine the public meaning
of the “extraordinary writs” as it existed in 1984.
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a. By 1984, Utah courts wielded broad writ power.
As already mentioned above, in 1944, this Court held that under its
habeas authority, it could correct not only jurisdictional errors, but also
constitutional errors. See Thompson, 152 P.2d at 92. Until the 1984 amendment,
this Court never retreated from the position it staked in Thompson. Instead, this
Court only further declared that habeas and other writ powers.
Over these forty years, this Court and lower courts used the habeas
powers to reach a variety of issues. Under that authority, courts decided child
custody issues. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Services, 680 P.2d 753, 754 (Utah 1984);
Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 100 (Utah 1946). They decided whether people
could be extradited. Buchanan v. Hayward, 663 P.2d 70, 71 (Utah 1983); Little v.
Beckstead, 358 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1961); McCoy v. Harris, 160 P.2d 721, 722
(Utah 1945). They decided whether prisoners held by other jurisdictions were
properly under a detainer issued by Utah, and vice versa. Hearn v. State, Utah,
621 P.2d 707 (1980); Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733, 734 n.1 (Utah 1982). Utah
courts decided whether probationers had been accorded due process. Baine v.
Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah 1959); Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640, 641
(Utah 1944). They even decided whether conditions of confinement were
unlawful. Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1981); Wickham v. Fisher, 629
P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1981); Ex parte S.H., 264 P.2d 850, 851 (Utah 1953). And,
of course, courts decided “core” habeas claims, like whether a defendant was
properly restrained prior to a trial. McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah
1983); Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).
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Beyond these other sorts of issues, though, the habeas power was
regularly used to decide postconviction claims. See, e.g., Brady v. Shulsen, 689
P.2d 1340, 1341 (Utah 1984); Horne v. Turner, 506 P.2d 1268, 1268 (Utah 1973);
Dodge v. State, 432 P.2d 640, 640 (Utah 1967); Forrest v. Graham, 261 P.2d 169,
169 (Utah 1953). And this Court was not ambiguous in asserting the reach of
the writ power, repeating that relief could be granted even on issues that could
have been raised earlier. Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979);
Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968).
Throughout this history, this Court never seemed to doubt the reach of
its writ powers. The closest it seems to have come was the occasional criticism
of the claims being presented. See, e.g., State v. Dodge, 425 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah
1967) (“He appeals pro se and assigns four grounds of error. We unduly
dignify them by discussing them at all.”). But even these comments reflect an
analysis of the merits (where there clearly was no merit), not a suggestion that
the Court lacked authority to reach the merits of important constitutional
claims.
Rather than diminish the reach the reach of the habeas power, this Court
indicated that it could be combined with other writs with synergetic effect. For
example, it held that the habeas power could be combined with the certiorari
power, and together “they could be used for the same purpose as a writ of error
to review the proceedings of a court over which the issuing court had appellate
jurisdiction.” Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981).
When this history of the writ powers is considered in full, it reveals the
original meaning of the 1984 amendments. When Utahns ratified the new
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Judicial Article, they would not have understood the writ power narrowly,
reaching only specific issues such as postconviction claims, objections to
extradition, custody matters, or any other limited list of claims. Instead,
Utahns would have had a broad view of the power of the extraordinary writs;
the original public meaning would have been that the courts’ extraordinary
writ power allows them to decide and correct all issues relating to the restraint
of any person. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
Loy. L. Rev. 611, 644 (1999) (“[D]etermining original meanings entails
determining the level of generality with which a particular term was used.”);
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1269, 1280 (1997) (“A genuine commitment to the semantic intentions
of the Framers requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at which
the particular language was understood by its Framers.”).
Functionally, this is how the writs were used on the eve of the 1984
amendments. No longer did it matter what writ was invoked when petitioning.
Cf., e.g., Pratt v. Bd. of Police and Fire Com’rs, 49 P. 747, 750 (Utah 1897)
(delineating when quo warranto or mandamus must be used in dispute over an
office depending on circumstances). Instead, the various writs were invoked
with little distinction. Cf. Boggess, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981) (using writs of
habeas and certiorari to allow out-of-time appeal); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,
38 (Utah 1981) (writ of error coram nobis to allow out-of-time appeal); see also
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶¶ 26–27, 31, 122 P.3d 628 (creating an
extraordinary remedy when no remedy existed under PCRA).
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In sum, while the courts had the power to grant postconviction relief via
the grant of habeas power in the original constitution, by 1984, that power had
been become more firmly established. Indeed, rather than simply being a
distinct “habeas” power, the power to grant relief from confinement drew on
multiple writs. Thus, when Utah enshrined courts’ power as a separate branch
of government to “issue all extraordinary writs,” Utah Const., art. VIII sec. 3,
the people must have understood this authority to include postconviction
challenges to constitutional defects in a criminal case.
B.

The Court’s rule-making authority gives it primary control over
regulation of the extraordinary writs.
The extraordinary writ power in the Utah Constitution provides the

courts with the power to grant postconviction relief. The question remaining is
what the Legislature can do, if anything, to regulate the writ power.
At first glance, this appears to be a complicated question. On the one
hand, this Court has been very consistent in its holdings that the Legislature
cannot expand or diminish the courts’ writ powers. Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3,
¶14, 387 P.3d 1040 (citing State v. Durand, 104 P. 760, 762 (Utah 1908)). On the
other hand, it is possible to find a number of old decisions in which this Court
has ruled that the writ powers were unavailable based on restrictions imposed
by the Legislature. See, e.g., Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 73 Utah 199, 273 P.
306, 311 (1928) (per curiam). On their face, these holdings seem irreconcilable.
But this conundrum is resolved once these cases are considered in light
of another historical fact: originally this Court recognized the Legislature as
having near-exclusive authority to make rules governing procedure in the
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courts. “[A]lthough the supreme court possessed some power over procedural
rulemaking and the practice of law during this period, the legislature retained
ultimate control over establishing procedural rules for Utah courts.” Kent R.
Hart, Court Rulemaking in Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah
Constitution, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 153, 155–56 (1992); Brown, 2017 UT 3, ¶17 n.8.
Because of this dynamic, early decisions often defined the writ as one
thing and the writ as regulated by statute as something else. See Salt Lake City
Water & Elec. Power Co. v. City of Salt Lake City, 67 P. 791, 791–92 (Utah 1902)
(interpreting certiorari power broadly based on “settled law in England as well
as in this country” and prior decision in Gilbert v. Board of P. & F. Com’rs, 40 P.
264 (1895)); Pincock v. Kimball, 228 P. 221, 223 (Utah 1924) (interpreting
certiorari power narrowly and disavowing Gilbert and Salt Lake City Water as
inconsistent with statute); Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42 (with the rule power shifted
back to this Court, relying on Gilbert to define breadth of certiorari power);
accord State v. Elliott, 44 P. 248, 250 (Utah 1896) (“Except when changed by
statute, the rule of procedure [for quo warranto] is practically the same in this
country as in England.”); State v. Ryan, 125 P. 666, 668 (Utah 1912) (“The
proceeding in the nature of quo warranto is regulated by statute in this state.”).
Through its former rule-making power, the Legislature was able to limit how
the extraordinary writs were used despite their proclaimed immutability.
Since those early decisions, however, this Court has clarified that the
judiciary has authority to regulate procedure. Beyond the amendments to the
writ power, the 1984 revision of the Judicial Article made an important
change: it “solidified [this Court’s] constitutional authority to adopt rules of
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evidence and procedure.” Brown, 2017 UT 3, ¶17 n.8. (citing Utah Const. art.
VIII, sec. 4).
In light of the 1984 amendments, the question of regulation is simplified,
and it is answered by a review of a few basic principles. Normally, that the
Legislature defines rights and remedies, while it is left to this Court to
promulgate the rules of procedure that govern their adjudication. See, e.g., State
v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶¶ 26–27, 233 P.3d 476. But by directly granting courts the
power to issue extraordinary writs, the Utah Constitution takes that power out
of the Legislature’s hands and gives the judiciary authority to define those
substantive rights—as discussed above, one of the remedies secured in the
Utah Constitution is the power for the court to grant postconviction relief.
With respect to procedure—how will claims be processed?—the
Legislature’s power is well defined, but limited. It can amend this Court’s rules
by a supermajority vote. Brown, 2017 UT 3, ¶17 n.8. By that route, the
Legislature may regulate the process for considering claims by amending the
rules of procedure relevant to the courts’ habeas authority.
There may eventually be some question on what limits can be imposed
by rule. Rules of procedure cannot alter substantive rights. See State v.
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 40, 279 P.3d 371; AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and
Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 n.2 (Utah 1986). And “[t]he distinction between
substantive and procedural law . . . is not always clear.” DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258
So. 3d 1219, 1225 (Fla. 2018). Yet, in this case before the Court, there can be
no question. Mr. Patterson sought postconviction review, and the only dispute
before this court is the timeliness of his petition. “You can’t get much more
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procedural than a filing deadline.” State v. Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶ 58, 416 P.3d
520; accord Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). Because the proper
time to petition the court to exercise its habeas authority is a procedural
question, this Court retains full authority to say what claims are timely.
As it now stands, there is no time limit for filing extraordinary writs. See
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT
51, ¶ 24, 238 P.3d 1054. And to the extent that the PCRA attempts to impose
limits on the courts’ writ power, those limits are invalid as inconsistent with the
Court’s primary rulemaking authority. Nor could the provisions of the PCRA
be considered “amendments” to this Court’s rules. See Brown, 2017 UT 3,
¶¶ 18–23. And Rule 65C cannot be considered as a rule adopted to regulate the
writ because it applies by its own terms only to “proceedings in all petitions for
post-conviction relief file under the [PCRA].” URCP 65C(a). Instead, what is
left is this Court’s prior statements on what few limits may be placed on
meritorious claims. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (“[P]roper
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will
always be in the interests of justice.”); Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah
1998) (“[A] petitioner’s failure to comply with a statute of limitations may
never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition.”).
Having such control over the use of the writ power, including its habeas
component, does not make this Court unique. Other courts possess both the
power to grant habeas relief and the power to define rules of procedure. They,
too, have resisted legislative efforts to impose limits on habeas relief. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 64 (Fla. 2000) (“For all of these reasons, we
26

conclude that the establishment of time limitations for the writ of habeas
corpus is a matter of practice and procedure and, therefore, the judiciary is the
only branch of government authorized by the Florida Constitution to set such
deadlines.”); State v. Fowler, 752 P.2d 497, 502 (Ariz. App. 1st Div. 1987) (ruling
that a legislatively imposed time limit on the right to postconviction relief was
invalid because “[t]he right to post-conviction relief is substantive but the time
limits are purely procedural”).
And in the bigger picture, recognizing this Court’s power to control and
grant postconviction relief is not as big of a change as it seems. Under the rulemaking authority, this Court has adopted a number of procedural rules that
allow individuals convicted of a crime the opportunity to seek postconviction
relief, just on narrower grounds.
For example, Rule 24 allows defendants to request a new trial, see
URCrP 24(a) & (c), and this rule seems to accommodate any constitutional
claim. See, e.g., State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶ 31, 37 P.3d 1073 (reviewing a
Brady claim raised by a new trial motion under URCrP 24); State v. Hales, 2007
UT 14, ¶ 68, 152 P.3d 321 (reviewing an ineffective assistance claim under the
same rule). Its major limitation is its short time limit of 14 days (though that
time may be prospectively extended). See URCrP 24(c). But this Court has
power to increase that time under its rulemaking authority.
Similarly, a defendant can raise a constitutional claim of ineffective
assistance on his direct appeal that would otherwise have to wait until later.
URCrP 23B; cf. Utah Code § 78b-9-104(1)(d). Rule 22 permits defendants to
raise certain constitutional claims against their sentences, even after a direct
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appeal. See URCrP 22(e)(1)(C) & (e)(2). And the ever-adaptable URCP 60(b)
has been blessed as a stop-gap that obviates the need to resort to extraordinary
writs where the PCRA by its terms does not apply. See, e.g., State v. Boyden,
2019 UT 11, ¶¶ 25–42, 441 P.3d 737 (authorizing use of rule so the State could
attack a judgment); Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 18, 359 P.3d 592 (authorizing
use of rule to challenge pleas-in-abeyance). There is no apparent reason why
these rules could not be expanded to cover more claims, too.
Notably, this Court has used its rule-making power to avoid resorting to
its writ powers. Under Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(f), a court can reinstate a
defendant’s right to an appeal. Before this rule was adopted, courts used their
writ power for the same purpose. See Boggess, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981); State
v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981); Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶¶ 26–27.
So, while there is presently no applicable rule that Mr. Patterson could
use to avoid the need to call on the extraordinary writ, there is no reason why
there could not be. This Court can, if it chooses, adopt procedural rules that
avoid the need to resort to its extraordinary writ power in cases where the
PCRA prohibits relief, but relief should otherwise be available.
Moreover, this discussion of the rule power shows that this Court is
institutionally competent to decide when and on what terms postconviction
relief should be available when a conviction is marred by constitutional
violations. The rules currently provide for postconviction relief on certain
narrow issues. And prior to PCRA, former Rule 65B governed all
postconviction proceedings (other than those governed by some the niche rules
mentioned above). Unless every grant of postconviction relief made under one
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of these rules is ultra vires, there can be no legitimate objection to this Court
occupying the field again.

III. CONCLUSION
Under the 1984 amendments, this Court and the lower courts have the
authority to grant postconviction relief under their extraordinary writ power.
Because that power is granted by the Utah Constitution to this Court and the
district courts, the Legislature cannot regulate it except under the shared
rulemaking power.
The preceding arguments answer the questions this Court asked,
demonstrating that Utah courts have the power to provide postconviction relief
via extraordinary writs.
1. The people of Utah in both 1896 and 1984 would have understood the
courts’ writ power to include postconviction relief from constitutional errors in
a criminal conviction. The public understanding at both points is relevant to
Mr. Patterson’s claims, but it is ultimately the public understanding in 1984 that
controls because that amendment is in force today.
2. The 1984 amendment enshrined the courts’ writ authority as it was
being exercised in 1984 without modification or restriction. By 1984 it was well
understood that this authority included a comprehensive power to grant
postconviction relief and other relief from confinement.
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3. While the Legislature generally defines substantive rights, the Utah
Constitution provides a substantive habeas right and gives it to the judiciary.
The breadth of that power cannot be diminished.
4. This Court’s rulemaking power gives it the primary authority to
dictate how the writ power is exercised, subject only to the Legislature’s limited
power to amend.
Mr. Patterson has asked this Court to interpret the PCRA in a way that
allows his claims to be heard on the merits. But if the Court decides the
PCRA’s statute of limitations does not permit that, the Court should allow his
claims to be heard under the Utah courts’ constitutional authority to issue
extraordinary writs.
Consistent with the arguments in his original briefing, Mr. Patterson’s
case should be remanded to the district court so his claims can be considered
on their merits, either under the PCRA or under the extraordinary writ power.
DATED: July 19, 2018.
/s/ Benjamin C. McMurray

Counsel for Scott Patterson
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Appendix, Part A
This portion of the appendix contains all of the historic newspaper
articles cited in the brief except for one. It excludes “The Snow Case,” Salt
Lake Herald-Republican (Feb. 18, 1887), because that is essentially a verbatim
reprint of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 280
(1887). Nevertheless, it is available for review at
https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6xd27cm/10813468.
The articles are presented in chronological order, oldest to newest.

“Petition of Habeas Corpus,” Deseret Evening News (October 22, 1886).

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6vf0zjh/23181922

A1

“Writ Denied,” Deseret News (October 27, 1886).

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6931nq0/2667786

A2

“Another Judicial Straw,” Deseret News (Nov. 3, 1886).

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s65b0x14/2667860

A3

“The Snow Habeas Corpus Case,” Deseret Evening News (Nov. 26, 1886)

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s63v3h80

A4

“A Very Important Case,” Deseret Evening News, (Dec. 27, 1886).

https://newspapers.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s6w41wc1/23182213
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Appendix, Part B
This portion of the appendix contains the Report of the Utah
Constitutional Revision Commission that was submitted to the Utah
Legislature in 1984. The parts of the report that do not address the Judicial
Article have been omitted. The complete report is available at:
http://digitallibrary.utah.gov/awweb/guest.jsp?smd=1&cl=all_lib&lb_docum
ent_id=78702.
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Utah Constitutional Revision Commission
436 State Capitol • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 • (801)533-5481

Honorable Scott M. Matheson
Governor of the State of Utah
Honorable Members of the 45th Legislature
of the State of Utah

The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission is pleased to submit this report
of its work during the 1982 and 1983 legislative interims. The work of the
commission during this period has included further study of the Judicial and the
Education Articles as well as a review of the Legislative Article.
The commission has devoted a great deal of time and attention in preparing
the recommendations included in this report. In addition to its own detailed study,
the commission has received input from a broad cross section o f interested parties,
including public officials, interested organizations and citizen groups, as well as the
public at large. Their participation was a valuable contribution in preparing the
commission recommendations.
This report will discuss in depth the commission's proposals for major revisions
of the Judicial A rticle (A rticle VIII) and the Education A rticle (A rticle X). The
commission has also proposed an important amendment to the Legislative Article
(A rticle VI). The report also includes an overview of previous commission
recommendations and a summary of the 1982 election, reviewing the four
constitutional amendments that were on the ballot.
The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission has been charged to conduct a
comprehensive examination of the Utah Constitution and to recommend those
changes necessary to provide Utah with the tools to address present and future
needs. We appreciate the opportunity we have had to serve in this capacity, and
hope that our efforts will receive serious consideration and ultimately prove to be of
benefit to the people of Utah.
UTAH C O N STITU TIO N AL REVISION
COMMISSION

Vice Chairman

Karl N. Snow, Jr., Chairman, Provo • William G. Fowler, Vice Chairman, Salt Lake City • Norman H. Bangerter, W e s t Valley
City • James E. Faust, Salt Lake City • Jefferson B. Fordham, Salt Lake City • Martin B. Hickman, Provo • Raymond L.
Hixson, Salt Lake City • Richard C. Howe, Murray • Dixie Leavitt, Cedar City • Clifford S. LeFevre, Clearfield • Eddie P.
Mayne, W e s t Valley City • Jon M. Memmott, Layton • Wilford R. Black, Jr., Salt Lake City • G. LaMont Richards, Salt Lake
City • Phyllis C. Southwick, Bountiful • Glade M. Sowards, Vernal • Roger O. Tew, Executive D irector
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INTRODUCTION

THE UTAH CO NSTITU TIO NAL REVISION COMMISSION
A N N U A L REPORT, 1982 A N D 1983

This report contains a review of the studies and recommendations of the
Constitutional Revision Commission for the years 1982 and 1983. The report
contains the following information:
•Legislative action taken on commission recommendations made to the
Budget Session of the 44th Legislature - January, 1982 (See Report of the
Constitutional Revision Commission - January 1982.)
•The commission's involvement with, and the results of, the 1982 General
Election;
•A review of the commission's recommendations to the General Session of
the 4.5th Legislature; and
•The commission's recommendations to the Budget Session of the 45th
Legislature, or if necessary, a special session of the 45th Legislature. The
commission has prepared proposals for significant change to three articles of
the Utah Constitution: (a) the Judicial Article, (b) the Education Article, and
(c)
the Legislative Article.
For each recommendation discussed, an
introduction and overview will be offered, followed by a detailed
section-by-section analysis which will include old and new language,
explanations, and a rationale.
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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION

The Constitutional Revision Commission was originally organized in 1969 to
study and recommend needed revisions of the Utah Constitution. Concerns had been
expressed for many years that the Utah Constitution needed serious overhaul.
However, a proposal to call a constitutional convention to completely rewrite the
constitution had been rejected by the voters in 1966.
A t the same time the commission was organized, the Utah Legislature
proposed the Gateway Amendment. This amendment allowed for the revision of
entire constitutional articles which could then be presented to the public as a single
ballot issue. The Gateway Amendment was approved by the electorate at the 1970
General Election.
Commission Activities - Prior to 1977
The Constitutional Revision Commission existed on an ad hoc basis until 1977.
During this period, the commission proposed the following amendments:
—Legislative A rticle (partial revision)
presented to the 39th Legislature, January 1971 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1972
—Executive Article
presented to the 40th Legislature, January 1973 (approved)
rejected by voters, November 1974
—Elections and Right of Suffrage Article
presented to 41st Legislature, January 1976 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1976
—Congressional and Legislative Appointment Article
presented to 41st Legislature, January 1976 (not approved)
Establishment of the Commission as a Permanent Body
The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission was established as a permanent
commission by the 42nd Legislature in 1977. The commission is empowered to,
"make a comprehensive examination of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and of
the amendments thereto, and thereafter to make recommendations to the
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governor and the legislature as to specific proposed constitutional amendments
designed to carry out the commission's recommendations for changes therein." (See
Appendix A for a copy of the statute.)
In reviewing and revising the Utah Constitution, the commission has sought to
develop a document that protects essential rights and basic institutions while at the
same time allowing for flexibility to address future needs. The commission has,
therefore, recommended deleting references to policies or practices that could be
better established by statute. In addition, the commission has tried to eliminate
certain ambiguities between long-standing practice and actual constitutional
language. In many cases, constitutional requirements and prohibitions have been
ignored for years. The commission has recommended removing these long-neglected
provisions as well as other outdated sections from the constitution.
The commission consists of 16 members. The president of the senate appoints
three state senators, the speaker of the house appoints three state representatives,
and the governor appoints three members. Six members are then chosen by these
nine appointees. The director of the O ffice of Legislative Research and General
Counsel serves as an ex officio member. (Exhibit 1 contains a complete list of the
Constitutional Revision Commission's members and staff.)

Commission Activities - Since 1977
Since 1977, the commission has been active in reviewing and revising the
constitution. It has recommended revisions of the following:
--Revenue and Taxation Article
presented to the 43rd Legislature, January 1980 (approved)
rejected by voters, November 1980
presented to the 44th Legislature, January 1982 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1982
—Labor Article
presented to the 43rd Legislature, January 1979 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1980
—Executive Article
presented to the 43rd Legislature, January 1979 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1980
—Judicial Article
presented to the 44th Legislature, January 1982 (not approved)
In addition to these formal study proposals, the commission has assisted in
developing other constitutional amendments which have been submitted to the
legislature independently. The commission has been instrumental in obtaining
legislative and public approval for these changes. Specifically, these proposals
include:
—Legislative Compensation Commission
presented to the 44th Legislature, January 1982 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1982
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—Corporate O fficers Amendment
presented to the 44th Legislature, January 1982 (approved)
approved by voters, November 1982
As a bipartisan body, composed of both legislators and and citizen members,
the Constitutional Revision Commission has demonstrated a unique capacity to
develop meaningful proposals for improving the Utah Constitution.
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EXHIBIT I
MEMBERS OF THE UTAH C O N ST ITU TIO N A L REVISION COMMISSION

Karl N. Snow, Jr., Chairman
(term expired 1983
reappointed until 1989)

Senate Appointee
State Senator
Provo

William G. Fowler, Vice Chairman
(term expired 1983,
reappointed until 1989)

Governor Appointee
Citizen Member
Salt Lake City

James E. Faust
(term expired 1981,
reappointed until 1987)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
Salt Lake City

Norman H. Bangerter
(appointed 1981,
term expires 1987)

House Appointee
State Representative, Speaker of the House
West Valley City

Martin B. Hickman
(term expired 1979
reappointed until 1985)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
Provo

Raymond L. Hixson
(term expired 1983,
reappointed until 1989)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
Salt Lake City

Richard C. Howe
(term expires 1985)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
Murray

Dixie Leavitt
(term expired 1981,
reappointed until 1987)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
Cedar City

C lifford S. LeFevre
(term expires 1985)

House Appointee
State Representative
Clearfield

Eddie P. Mayne
(term expired 1979,
reappointed until 1985)

CRC Appointee
Citizen Member
West Valley City

Jon M. Memmott
(ex o fficio )

Director, O ffice of Legislative Research
and General Counsel
Layton

Jefferson B. Fordham
(appointed 1981,
term expires 1987)

Governor Appointee
Citizen Member
Salt Lake City
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Darrell G. Renstrom
(term expired 1983)

Senate Appointee
State Senator
Ogden

Wilford R. Black
(appointed 1983,
term expires 1989)

Senate Appointee
State Senator
Sait Lake City

G. LaMont Richards
(term expired 1979,
reappointed until 1985)

House Appointee
State Representative
Salt Lake City

Phyllis C. Southwick
(term expired 1983,
reappointed until 1989)

Governor Appointee
Citizen Member
Bountiful

Glade M. Sowards
(term expired 1981,
reappointed until 1987)

Senate Appointee
State Senator
Vernal

The following were constituted commission subcommittees during the period
covered by this report.
Education A rticle Subcommittee

Judicial Article Subcommittee

Mr. Clifford S. LeFevre, Chairman
Rep. G. LaMont Richards
Sen. Karl N. Snow, Jr.
Mr. Dixie Leavitt
Speaker Norman H. Bangerter
Mr. Eddie P. Mayne
Mr. Raymond L. Hixson
Sen. Wilford R. Black
Mr. Jon M. Memmott

Dr. Martin B. Hickman, Chairman
Mr. William G. Fowler
Elder James E. Faust
Dr. Jefferson Fordham
Justice Richard C. Howe
Mr. Darrell G. Renstrom
Dr. Phyllis C. Southwick
Sen. Glade M. Sowards
Mr. Jon M. Memmott

Staff
Roger O. Tew

Executive Director, 1981 - Present

Robin Riggs

Research Assistant, 1980 - 1982

Ivan Legler

Research Assistant, 1981

Kevin Howard

Research Assistant, 1982 - 1983

Brian McKell

Research Assistant, 1983

Shelly Cordon

Research Assistant, 1983 - Present

Jan Poulson

Secretary, 1981 - Present
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R E PO R T OF THE 1982 BUDGET SESSION

The Constitutional Revision Commission presented two major proposals to the
budget Session of the 44th Legislature: a revision of the Revenue and Taxation
Article, and a revision of the Judicial Article. (See Report of the Constitutional
Revision Commission - January 1982.) In addition, the legislature considered three
other constitutional amendments, two of which the commission was instrumental in
developing.
Revenue and Taxation A rticle Revision
The Revenue and Taxation A rticle Revision (introduced as SJR 3) proposed a
series of changes to the present constitution dealing with tax policy. C ollectively,
the proposal provided the legislature with the authority to implement various tax
exemptions and policies.
The legislature approved the Revenue and Taxation Article Revision as
presented by the commission with the following amendments (see Appendix B for a
copy of the resolution as amended by the legislature):
1.

The proposed tax exemption for tangible personal property was deleted.

2.

The residential property tax exemption ceiling was lowered. The
commission had proposed that the residential property tax exemption be
limited at 50 percent of the property's assessed valuation. The legislature
lowered the ceiling to 45 percent.

3.

The vertical revenue sharing proposed by the commission was deleted.
This provision would have authorized revenue sharing between the state
and its political subdivisions.

The most controversial provision of the amendment was the residential
property tax exemption. During the 1982 Budget Session, the legislature passed
legislation to impiement the exemption at a level of 25 percent (HB 142 - 1982).
Enactment of the measure was tied to the passage of the Tax A rticle by the
electorate.
Judicial A rticle Revision
The commission introduced a comprehensive revision of the Judicial A rticle to
the 1982 Budget Session of the legislature. The proposal (HJR 10) was considered
and approved by the house of representatives. The senate, however, deferred action
on the proposal. Chapter II discusses the issues raised by the legislature, and
subsequent efforts to develop an acceptable Judicial A rticle revision.
Other Constitutional Amendments
Legislative Compensation Commission
The Budget Session of the 44th Legislature also considered and approved a
measure calling for the establishment of a legislative salary commission. This
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proposal, while not formally Introduced as a commission recommendation, was
actually the product of previous commission study efforts. The amendment,
introduced as SJR 5, provided for the creation of an independent legislative salary
commission to recommend salary levels for legislators. The governor would appoint
the members of the salary commission. The legislature would be required to
approve, reject or lower the recommendations. (See Appendix B for a copy of the
resolution.)
SJR 5 provided needed flexibility in establishing legislative compensation. It
removed the specific dollar figures from the constitution and allowed the legislature
to create by legislative rule a mechanism for reimbursing expenses. The measure
was endorsed by the commission.
Legislative Residency Amendment
A final constitutional amendment considered and approved by the 1982 Budget
Session was HJR 1. This proposal required legislators to live in their districts
throughout their term of office. If a legislator moves from the district, the o ffic e
would be vacated and filled according to existing statutory procedures. The
measure originated independently of the commission, but did receive an
endorsement from the commission prior to the 1982 General Election. (See
Appendix B for a copy of the resolution.)
Corporate O fficers Amendment
This measure (introduced as HJR 27) proposed to remove a seldom-enforced
prohibition on corporate officers holding public o ffic e in municipalities which grant
a business license to the corporation. The commission did not formally introduce
the proposal to the legislature, but the issue was originally raised by commission
studies. A fter approval by the legislature, the measure received commission
endorsement. (See Appendix B for a copy of the resolution.)
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R E PO R T OF THE 1982 G E N E R A L E LE C TIO N

The 1982 General Election ballot included four constitutional amendments.
1.

Proposition 1—Revenue and Taxation A rticle Revision

2.

Proposition 2—-Legislative Compensation Commission Amendment

3.

Proposition 3—Legislative Residency Amendment

4.

Proposition 4—Corporate O fficers Amendment

The previous section detailing the actions of the 1982 Budget Session briefly
outlined the four proposals and the Constitutional Revision Commission's
involvement with each proposed amendment.
This section describes the
commission's efforts to achieve voter approval in the 1982 General Election. These
efforts were ultimately successful, with all four proposed amendments being
approved by the electorate.
The Constitutional Revision Commission took an active role in providing
educational information about the proposed amendments.
In addition, the
commission provided information to the lieutenant governor for the official voter
information pamphlet which was distributed to all voters of the state.
The commission carefully avoided expending any public funds for advertising
or any direct promotional efforts for the amendments. Its efforts were confined to
providing general educational information on the Utah Constitution and issues
surrounding the 1982 ballot proposals. The commission was instrumental in
developing a wide-ranging informational program which included a speaker's bureau
and informational mailings to public officials and civic groups. Commission
members also appeared on various media programs to discuss the amendments.
An independent promotional organization was created by interested citizens to
solicit funds and to directly promote the passage of the amendments—particularly
Proposition 1. This organization, known as Citizens for Constitutional Improvement,
actively raised money and campaigned for the amendments.
In the final analysis, however, it was the direct involvement by the governor,
the legislature, both major political parties, the education community, and other key
public leaders, which convinced the electorate of the need to approve the proposed
amendments. Their efforts focused primarily on the passage of Proposition 1. All
of the amendments, however, received broad support and endorsement. (Exhibit 2
summarizes the actual election results.)
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EXHIBIT 2
1982 CO NSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
GENERAL ELECTION SUMMARY

Final Vote Summary
Proposition i - Tax Article Revision
For
341,263
64.7%
Against
185,924
35.3%
Proposition 2 - Citizen Salary Commission
For
352,195
67.1%
Against
172,380
32.9%
Proposition 3 - Residency Requirement
For
403,694
82.7%
Against
84,229
17.3%
Proposition 4 - Corporate O fficers
For
293,289
62.5%
Against
176,270
37.5%
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R E PO R T OF THE 1983 G E N E R A L SESSION

The Constitutional Revision Commission did not recommend any proposals to
the 1983 General Session of the 45th Legislature. Commission studies had not been
completed for consideration for the legislature at its general session. The
commission, therefore, voted to introduce any proposed amendments to either the
1984 Budget Session or to a subsequent special session. It should be noted that the
commission unanimously endorsed the concept of a special session to review
constitutional amendments.
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CHAPTER II

JUDICIAL ARTICLE
BACKGROUND
The
following
information
summarizes
the
Constitutional
Revision
Commission's Judicial A rticle study. The material includes a brief review of the
commission's action from 1980 to 1982, as well as a more extensive review of the
commission's Judicial A rticle study since the 1982 Budget Session.
Judicial A rticle Study 1980 to 1982
(See Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission - January 1982)
The Constitutional Revision Commission actually first examined the Judicial
A rticle (A rticle VIII) in 1975. At the direction of the Utah Legislature (SJR 3 1973), the commission reviewed the positions of a special task force on court
organization and the Utah State Bar which had recommended changes in the Judicial
Article. (See Utah Courts Tomorrow - Report and Recommendations of the Unified
Court Advisory Committee, September 1972, and the recommendation of the Utah
State Bar, April 1972). The commission, after a preliminary examination of the
proposals, declined to recommend any changes in A rticle VIII to the legislature.
The Constitutional Revision Commission began its most recent review of the
Judicial A rticle in 1980 by supporting a simple amendment to eliminate automatic
appeals to the supreme court (HJR 20 - 1980). The measure was ultimately rejected
by the legislature. However, even though the commission supported the proposal,
there was concern that the entire Judicial A rticle merited extensive review. As
such, a total review of the article was included on the commission's 1981 study
agenda.
During the i 981 study year, a Judicial A rticle Subcommittee was formed to
more clearly focus the commission's resources on the Judicial A rticle study. The
commission staff did extensive background work on the problems associated with the
present Judicial Article. Several hearings were conducted with representatives of
the judiciary to discover areas of concern. The commission's work indicated that, in
addition to the appeals problems, other substantive issues warranted review.
Specifically, changes in the administration of the judiciary and clarification of the
judicial selection process were needed.
The Constitutional Revision Commission defined three major objectives that
the revised Judicial A rticle should address. They were:
1.

to articulate the role of the judiciary as a co-equal branch o f government
within the historical framework of the system of checks and balances;
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2.

to provide the means to develop a more efficien t and e ffe c tiv e judicial
system; and

3.

to attract and maintain quality judges. The proposal, introduced to the
1982 Budget Session of the legislature as HJR 10, was developed to
accomplish these objectives.

The 1982 Budget Session
HJR 10 was reviewed closely by the legislature.
A fter significant
amendments, the proposal was adopted by the house of representatives. These
amendments concerned incorporating a specific reference to justice of the peace
courts and restoring the general authority of the legislature to establish the judicial
selection process. However, the measure was not acted upon by the senate.
It was in fact the controversy over the selection of judges which ultimately
precluded action by the senate. Just prior to the beginning of the legislative
session, the Utah Supreme Court ruled on a controversial case challenging the
authority of the senate to review judicial appointments. Matheson v. Ferry, 641
P.2d 674 (1982). In this case, the Court struck down the statutory provision
requiring senate confirmation of judicial appointments. The political atmosphere
surrounding the case made adoption of the Judicial A rticle revision impossible. As a
result, no action was taken and the commission was asked to further study the
revision.
The 1982-1983 Judicial A rticle Study
Following the actions of the 1982 Budget Session, the Constitutional Revision
Commission again undertook a review of the Judicial A rticle. The Judicial A rticle
subcommittee was reconstituted and began to work on the article.
Further study was slowed, however, by a second court case. Again, the
governor challenged a statute providing for senate confirmation of judicial
appointments. The action was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court shortly before
the beginning of the 1983 General Session. Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 240 (1982).
As a result, the commission did not introduce a proposal to the 1983 General Session.
Following this second litigation on judicial selection, the Judicial A rticle
subcommittee began its work in earnest. It was decided by the subcommittee to
support most of the previous positions taken in developing HJR 10. However, the
subcommittee did reexamine those issues raised by the legislature in 1982.
On the justices of the peace issue, the subcommittee again supported deleting
specific reference to them from the constitution. As before, this action was taken
to provide legislative flexibility and to avoid unnecessary specificity. The
commission, however, did not intend that this recommendation reflect on the value
of the justice of the peace system. Rather, the commission position simply states
that no court of limited jurisdiction should be mentioned in the constitution.
In examining the selection process for judges, primary concern centered on
balancing the interests of the legislature, the governor, the courts, and the public.
The subcommittee's study indicated that aspects of the current selection process,
specifically the election procedures, contained significant potential for abuse. In
some instances, incumbent judges stand for a retention election only based on their
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record as a judge. If opposed, however, an incumbent judge must participate in a
contested election. In the view of the subcommittee, this "hybrid" approach
provided neither meaningful review of judges' records nor protection against undue
politicizing of judicial elections. As a result, the subcommittee again recommended
retention elections only for incumbent judges.
The commission had previously not included senate confirmation as part of the
judicial selection process. It fe lt that the original commission proposal provided
adequate legislative involvement at the nominating level.
However, the
subcommittee now recommended that a senate rejection provision be included,
coupled with a strict prohibition on legislative involvement at the nominating level.
This approach satisfied concerns over any one governmental branch exercising undue
control over judicial appointments.
The full Constitutional Revision Commission considered and adopted the
subcommittee recommendations with minor amendments. The full commission
restored a provision regarding public prosecutors. Current language provides for
elected county attorneys. The subcommittee supported deletion of the provision,
arguing for legislative flexibility.
The full commission adopted a provision
establishing a system of public prosecutors to be selected as provided by statute.
The Recommendations to the 1984 Budget Session
As with other commission recommendations, changes made in the Judicial
A rticle by the commission are comprehensive and do not follow closely the order of
the present article. Although the commission's proposal is different in organization
from that found in the present constitution, much of the substance o f the present
article is retained.
The following material presents a comparative outline showing the relationship
between the current constitution and the commission proposal,
and a
section-by-section analysis of the commission's proposal. The discussion will present
the current constitutional language as it relates to issues raised by the new
proposal. A short statement outlining the commission's rationale is also included.
(Appendix C contains a copy of the complete commission proposal as well as a copy
of the present Judicial A rticle.)
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COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

The following information is a summary comparing the Constitutional Revision
Commission's proposed Judicial A rticle revision and the present Judicial Article.
The information is organized by subject matter and shows how each document
addresses specific issues.

CRC PROPOSED
JUDICIAL ARTICLE REVISION
1. Court Structure (Section 1)
•Specifically mentions supreme
court and district court.

PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE
1.

•Allows other courts by statute
(juvenile, circuit, j.p.'s).
2. Supreme Court Organization (Sec. 2)
•Five justices plus additional.

Court Structure (Section 1)
•Specifically mentions supreme
court, district court, and
j.p.'s.
•Allows other courts by statute
(juvenile, circuit).

2.

Supreme Court Organization (Sec. 2)
•Five justices plus additional.

•Chief justice to be selected as
provided by law.

•Chief justice automatically justice
with least remaining time on term.

•Court may hear cases in panels.

•All cases must be heard by a
majority.

3. Supreme Court Jurisdiction (Sec. 3)
•Original jurisdiction over extra
ordinary writs and "certified" state
law questions.
•General appellate jurisdiction to be
exercised as provided by statute.

Supreme Court Rulemaking Authority
(Sec. 4)
•Empowers supreme court to adopt
court rules.
•Empowers supreme court to govern
practice of law.

3.

Supreme Court Jurisdiction (Sec. 4)
•Original jurisdiction over certain
specified writs.

•Appellate jurisdiction which requires
all cases filed originally in district
court to be heard. Specified how
appeals to be processed from j.p.
courts.
4. Supreme Court Rulemaking Authority
(Sec. 4)
•No stated authority for rulemaking
or governance of the practice of law
•Powers derived from inherent
judicial authority powers.
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•Authorizes use of retired judges and
pro tempore. (See Sec. 2)

•Sec. 2 authorizes use of a district
court judge to sit on supreme court.
No specific mention for use of other
retired judges.

"Supreme court by rule manages
the appellate process.

•Sec. 5 authorized use of judges pro
tempore

5.

District Court and Trial Court Organ
ization and Jurisdiction (Sec. 5)
•Original jurisdiction except
as limited by statute.

5.

District Court Organization and
Jurisdiction (Secs/5, 7, 8, 9)
•Original jurisdiction except as
as limited by law.

•Appellate jurisdiction as provided
by statute.

•Appellate jurisdiction from specific
trial courts.

0

•Guarantees right of appeal.

•Lists specific writs.

0

•Eliminates reference to specific
writs.
6.

Number of Judges/Judicial Districts
(Sec. 6)
•Allows legislature to establish
judicial districts (eliminates
reference to specific districts).

6.

Number of Judges/Judicial Districts
(Secs. 5 , 6, 8, 16)
•Specifies seven districts, the organizatic
of the seven may be changed.

7.

Qualifications for Judges (Sec. 7)
'Supreme court - 30 years/five-year
resident, admitted to practice.

7.

Qualifications for Judges (Secs. 2, 5)
•Supreme court - 30 years/five-year
resident, admitted to practice.

•Other courts of record - 25 years/
Three year resident, admitted to
practice.

•District Court - 25 years/three-year
resident, admitted to practice.

*lf district established, residency
in district.

Judicial Selection (Secs. 8, 9)
•Judicial Nominating Commissions
(no legislative involvement).
•Governor appointment.
‘ Senate review.
•Unopposed retention election after
Three years/then at end of each term.
•Prohibition on partisan involvement.

D

•Resident of judicial district.

D

•No mention of other courts.

n

•Courts not of record - as provided
by law.
8.

3

0
8.

Judicial Selection (Sec. 3)
•Method to be established by statute.
•Prohibition on partisan involvement.
Statutory Method
-Nominating Commissions
-Governor appointment
-Stand for election at first general
election following term-retention if
unopposed. (Juvenile court does not
stand for election - subject to
senate review.)
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9.

Judicial Prohibitions (Sec. 10)
•Private practice o f law.

9.

Judicial Prohibitions
•No similar prohibitions exist in
article.

•Holding elective nonjudicial
offices.
•Offices in political party.
10. Judicial Administration (Sec. 11)
•Establishes a judicial council.
•Representatives from each court.
•Chief justice head of council

11. Discipline and Removal of Judges
(Sec. 12)
•Establishes a judicial conduct
commission.

10. Judicial Administration (Sec. 7)
•No similar provision exists.
-Present judicial council exists by
statute.
•District court has supervisory
authority over "inferior" courts.
11. Discipline and Removal of Judges
(Secs. 11, 27, 28)
•General legislative authority
to develop standards for removal
of judges.

•Standards for discipline.
•Removal-by-address (2/3 vote
of each house).
•Impeachment still retained.
•Forfeiture by absence.
12. Judicial Salaries (Sec. 13)
•Legislature to provide for
compensation.

12. Judicial Salaries (Sec. 20)
•$3,000 until changed by law.

13. Retirement of Judges (Sec. 14)
•Legislature to establish standards
(deletes "uniform" requirement.)

13. Retirement of Judges (Sec. 28)
•Legislature to establish uniform
standards for retirement.

14. Public Prosecutors (Sec. 15)
•Legislature to provide for system of
public prosecutors.

14. Public Prosecutors (Sec. 10)
•Each county to have attorney.
•Elected to four-year term.

•Selected as provided by statute.
•No qualifications.
•Admitted to practice law.
NOTE — The proposed CRC revision deleted the following sections;
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

8 - Justice of the Peace Jurisdiction
11 - Removal by Address
13 - Disqualification of Judges
14 - Supreme Court Clerk
15 - Appointment of Relatives to O ffice
18 - Style of Process
19 - Form of Civil Action
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Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

14
15
18
19
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Supreme Court Clerk
Appointment of Relatives to O ffice
Style of Process
Form of Civil Action
Judges to be Conservators of Peace
Reporting Defects in Law
Publication of Decision
Extending Judges Terms
Decisions to be in Writing
Syllabus of Cases
Forfeiture of O ffice Due to Absence
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SECTIO N-BY-SECTIO N A N A LY SIS

Section I - Vesting of Judicial Powers
Present Language

Section 1. The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in the Senate
sitting as a court of impeachment, in a supreme court, in district courts,
in justice of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme
Court as may be established by law.
Sec. 17. The Supreme and District Courts shall be courts of record, and
each shall have a seal.

Proposed Language

Section 1. The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court,
and in such other courts as the legislature by statute may establish. The
supreme court, the district court, and such other courts designated by
statute shall be courts or record. Courts not of record may also be
established by statute.

Explanation

This section vests the judicial power of the state in the Utah Supreme Court,
establishes a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and
deletes specific reference to justice of the peace courts. Other courts of limited
jurisdiction, such as the juvenile court and the circuit court, are also not mentioned
specifically. Courts other than the supreme court and district court would be
established by the legislature. The proposed article specifically allows for the
creation of courts not of record such as justice of the peace courts. Courts not of
record are those courts which do not develop appealable records. The proposal also
deletes the reference to the senate sitting as a court of impeachment.

Rationale

This provision establishes the supreme court and the general jurisdiction trial
court (district court) as the constitutional foundation of the court system. The
legislature is empowered to establish additional courts as needed.
Most
constitutional scholars feel that specific delineation of courts is unnecessary.
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The provision does contain a reference to the trial court of general jurisdiction,
however, since that court is fundamental to a judicial system. The reference to the
senate sitting as a court of impeachment is removed because impeachment is
actually a legislative function. The Legislative Article (A rticle VI, Sec. 18) contains
a similar provision regarding the role of the senate in impeachment cases. As such,
the removal of this provision from the Judicial A rticle will have no impact on the
impeachment process.

Sect 2 - The Supreme Court
Present Language

Sec. 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, which number may
be increased or decreased by the legislature, but no alternation or
increase shall have the e ffe c t of removing a judge from o ffice. A
majority of the judges constituting the court shall be necessary to form a
quorum or render a decision. If a justice of the Supreme Court shall be
disqualified from sitting in a cause before said court, the remaining judges
shall call a district judge to sit with them on the hearing of such cause.
Every judge of the Supreme Court shall be at least thirty years of age, an
active member of the bar, in good standing, learned in the law, and a
resident of the state of Utah for the five years next preceding his
selection. The judge having the shortest term to serve, not holding his
o ffic e by selection to fill a vacancy before expiration of a regular term,
shall be the chief justice, and shall preside at all terms of the Supreme
Court, and in case of his absence, the judge, having in like manner, the
next shortest term, shall preside in his stead.

Proposed Language

Sec. 2. The supreme court shall be the highest court and shall consist of
at least fiv e justices. The number of justices may be changed by statute,
but no change shall have the e ffe c t of removing a justice from o ffice. A
chief justice shall be selected from among the justices of the supreme
court as provided by statute. The chief justice may resign as chief justice
without resigning from the supreme court. The supreme court by rule
may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in divisions. The
court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or
the Constitution of the United States, except on the concurrence of a
majority of all justices of the supreme court. If a justice of the supreme
court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a cause before
the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is disqualified
or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an active judge
from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the cause.

Explanation

This section retains the provision setting the number of supreme court justices
at five, but allows the legislature the authority to add additional justices. The
proposed language also allows the court to sit in divisions to render decisions not
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involving constitutional issues. Otherwise, a full majority is still necessary to
render a decision. Also, in case of a justice's disqualification only an active judge
from a lower court may be called in to sit with the supreme court.
The proposed article also provides for the selection of a chief justice in a
manner provided by statute. The current procedure provides for the selection of the
chief justice according to length of service on the bench. The chief justice may also
resign as chief justice without resigning from the supreme court.
Qualifications for supreme court justice have been moved to Sec. 7 of the
proposed revision.

Rationale

By providing the legislature with the authority to expand the supreme court,
the revision gives the legislature an additional option to deal with increasing
caseloads. Likewise, allowing the court to sit in divisions is another tool for
caseload management. The new selection process for the chief justice is
recommended
because the chief
justice
will
have
more
administrative
responsibilities under the new Judicial Article. A change in the process for
selecting the chief justice will permit a justice with appropriate administrative
skills to be selected for the position. The commission fe lt the legislature should be
free to determine the method for selecting the chief justice.
Finally, the commission fe lt that only active judges should be used to fill
temporary vacancies on the supreme court. The present constitution states that a
district court judge may be used. Historically, however, retired supreme court
justices have also been called to fill temporary vacancies. The proposed revision
empowers the supreme court to establish rules for the use of retired judges for
proceedings in lower courts (Sec. 4). However, the commission fe lt that only active
judges should be so employed for the supreme court.
The commission
recommendation follows federal court procedures where retired judges are used for
lower court proceedings, but not for the supreme court.

Sec. 3 - Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Present Language

Sec. 4. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, to
any part of the State, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in
actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself or the
Supreme Court, or before any district court or judge thereof of in the
State. In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of
that jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall hold at least three terms every
year and shall sit at the capital of the State.
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Proposed Language

Sec. 3. The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States. The supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the
supreme court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause.

Explanation

The proposed article outlines the jurisdiction of the supreme court. The
revision gives the court the original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to answer questions of state law in federal courts. The supreme court is vested with
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters. However, the legislature is empowered
to determine how that jurisdiction will actually be exercised. The court is also
given the necessary authority to issue writs and orders for the full exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. The provision deletes reference to the terms of the court as
well as the requirement that the court sit at the capital of the state.

Rationale

This section, in outlining the appellate and original jurisdiction of the supreme
court, grants broad authority to the court. The court's original jurisdiction has been
expanded to include dealing with questions of state law when used in federal courts.
The original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs has been retained, but is
written in more general language than that found in the present provision. The
court retains general appellate jurisdiction over all matters. However, the method
of exercising that jurisdiction is left to statute. The commission fe lt that the court
should not be compelled to actually hear all matters, but rather, options such as an
intermediate appellate court should be available. Vesting the authority with the
legislature established maximum flexibility to deal with caseload management. The
commission deleted the reference to court terms and location of sittings on the
basis that these items are better handled by court rule or statute.

Sec. 4 - Supreme Court Rulemaking
Present Language

There is no language in the present constitution providing the Supreme
Court with rulemaking authority. Any present rulemaking authority exists
pursuant to statute or by inference regarding the traditional role of the
judiciary.
Sec. 5. . . . Any cause in the district court (nay be tried by a judge pro
tempore, who must be a member of the bar sworn to try the cause, and
agreed upon by the parties, or their attorneys of record. . . .
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Proposed Language

Sec.
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to
be used in the courts o f the state and shall by rule manage the appellate
process. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the supreme
court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be
citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice
iaw in Utah. The supreme court by ruie shall govern the practice of iaw,
including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of
persons admitted to practice law.

Explanation

This section gives the supreme court general authority to establish rules of
procedure and evidence for the state's various courts. The court is also charged
with responsibility for managing the appellate process in those courts. The
rulemaking authority also includes a specific responsibility to govern the practice of
law, including the admission to practice and the discipline of attorneys. Lastly, the
section provides for rulemaking to govern the use of retired judges and judges pro
tempore and sets basic qualifications for judges pro tempore.

Rationale

Members of the commission fe lt that the rulemaking authority o f the supreme
court should be specifically included in the constitution. This power is considered
essential to the maintaining an independent judiciary. The revision also provides the
supreme court with clear constitutional authority for the governance o f the practice
of law. The commission fe lt that the practice of law is an inherent function of the
judiciary. Lastly, the commission decided that the supreme court should be charged
with managing the appellate process of the courts since it historically has assumed
that role. The provision regarding judges pro tempore is taken essentially from Sec.
5 of the present Judicial Article. The court is granted broad authority to employ
retired judges, subject to the limitation outlined in Sec. 2.

Sec.

5

- Jurisdiction of the District Court and Other Courts

Present Language

Sec. 5. . . . A ll civil and criminal business arising in any county must be
tried in such county, unless a change of venue be taken, in such areas as
may be provided by law. . . .
Sec. 7. The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, and a
supervisory control of the same. The District Court or any judge thereof,
shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction,
quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary to carry
into e ffe c t their orders, judgments and decrees, and to give them a
general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions.
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Sec. 8. . . . The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be as now
provided by law, but the legislature may restrict the same.
Sec. 9. From all final judgments of the District Courts, there shall be a
right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record
made in the court below, and under such regulations as may be provided
by law. In equity case the appeal may be on questions of both law and
fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone.
Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall
be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgments of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on
the questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as
shail be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on such
appeals shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute.

Proposed Language

Sec. 5. The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of
right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.

Explanation

The proposed article deletes all reference to the jurisdiction of courts other
than the district court. The district court is vested with general trial jurisdiction
except as may be limited by statute or the constitution. It also gives the court
power to issue all extraordinary writs, and permits appellate jurisdiction of the
court to be established by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts is established
by statute. Finally, the proposal establishes a right of appeal to an appropriate
appellate court.

Rationale
A trial court of general jurisdiction is considered essential to a judicial
system. As such, the district court is vested with that authority. However, there
are instances where limited authority for specialized matters may better be vested
in specialized trial courts. This section provides for those options. The district
court is also given the authority to issue all extraordinary writs. The jurisdiction of
other courts is to be established by statute. The commission felt that the authority
to establish the jurisdiction of most state courts properly lies with the legislature.
The proposed article also removes the provision mandating an appeal of all
final judgments of the district courts to the supreme court. This proposal would
instead provide for a right of appeal to any appropriate appellate court. The actual
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determination of how this appeal would be discharged would be determined by
statute or court rule. Again, this language was chosen to provide flexibility in
determining how the appellate process should be established. It should be noted that
the guaranteed right of appeal does not apply to matters raised originally with the
supreme court. The court's original jurisdiction is very limited, however, and the
commission fe lt that the court should not be mandated to hear appeals from its own
original decisions.

In addition to removing the supreme court's mandated appeals language, the
proposal also removes language requiring "de novo" appeals from the justice of the
peace courts to the district court.

Sec. 6 - Judicial Districts and Number of Judges
Present Language

Sec. 5. The state shall be divided into seven judicial districts, for each of
which, at least one judge shall be selected as hereinbefore provided. Until
otherwise provided by law, a district court at the county seat of each
county shall be held at least four times a year. . . .
Sec. 6. The Legislature may change the limits of any judicial district, or
increase or decrease the number of districts, or the judges thereof. No
alteration or increase shall have the e ffe c t of removing a judge from
o ffice. In every additional district established, a judge or judges shall be
selected as provided in section 3 of this article.
Sec. 8. The Legislature shall determine the number of justices of the
peace to be elected, and shall fix by law their powers, duties and
compensation. . . .
Sec. 16. This section specifically outlines the present judicial districts for
the district court. The most recent alignment of the seven judicial
districts became e ffe c tiv e July 1, 1982.

Proposed Language

Sec. 6. The number of judges of the district court and of other courts of
record established by the legislature shall be provided by statute. No
change in the number of judges shall have the e ffe c t of removing a judge
from o ffic e during a judge's term of o ffice. Geographic divisions for all
courts of record except the supreme court may be provided by statute.
No change in divisions shall have the e ffe c t of removing a judge from
o ffic e during a judge's term of office. The number of judges of courts not
of record shall be provided by statute.

Explanation

This section removes the specific limitation of seven judicial districts for the
district court from the constitution. Instead, the provision allows the legislature to
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establish appropriate judicial districts. This section also empowers the legislature
to determine the number of judges, but prevents political manipulation of judges by
preventing any change in number from removing a judge from o ffice during the
judge's term. Otherwise, geographic determination of judicial districts and number
of judges is to be established by statute.

Rationale

This section is basically unchanged from the present constitutional language.
The recommended change does, however, remove the specific enumeration of
judicial districts. In keeping with the policy of making constitutional language more
general, the specific duties, powers, and qualifications of judges were removed from
this section and included in broader language in Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the proposed
article.

Sec. 7 - Judicial Qualifications
Present Language

Sec. 2. . . . Every judge of the Supreme Court shall be at least thirty
years of age, an active member of the bar, in good standing, learned in
the law, and a resident of the state of Utah for the five years next
preceding his selection. . .
Sec. 5. . . . Each judge of a district court shall be at least twenty-five
years of age, an active member of the bar in good standing, learned in the
law, a resident of the state of Utah three years next preceding his
selection, and shall reside in the district for which he shall be
selected. . . .

Proposed Language

Sec. 7. Supreme court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding selection and
admitted to practice law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall
be at least 23 years old, United States citizens, Utah residents for three
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. If
geographic divisions are provided for any court, judges of that court shall
reside in the geographic division for which they are selected.

Explanation

The proposed article indicates that judges of all courts of record must be
citizens of the United States, Utah residents (five years for the supreme court,
three for other courts) and admitted to practice law in Utah. The present article
sets specific age and residency requirements for certain courts, but they are
scattered among several sections in the Judicial Article. In addition, the proposed
language
contains
a
more
general
residency
requirement
than
that
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found in the present article. Specifically, the provision states that if courts are
divided into districts, judges must reside in the district for which they are
selected.

Rationale

The commission agreed with those experts who indicated that specific
requirements beyond those of professional competence, age, United States
citizenship and basic residency should not be included in the constitution. By
placing specific qualifications in the constitution, it is intended that the legislature
be precluded from establishing additional requirements.

Sec. 8 - Judicial Selection
Present Language

Sec. 3. Judges of the supreme court and district courts shall be selected
for such terms and in such manner as shall be provided by law, provided,
however, that selection shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness
for o ffic e without regard to any partisan political considerations and free
from influence of any person whomsoever, and provided further that the
method of electing such judges in e ffe c t when this amendment is adopted
shall be followed until changed by law.

Proposed Language

Sec. 8. When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the governor shall fill
the vacancy by appointment from a list of at least three nominees
certified to the governor by the judicial nominating commission having
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30
days after receiving the list of nominees. If the governor fails to fill the
vacancy within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the supreme court
shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list o f nominees. The
legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions1
composition and procedures. No member of the legislature may serve as
a member of, nor may the legislature appoint members to any judicial
nominating commission. The senate shall consider and render a decision
on each judicial appointment within 30 days of the date of appointment.
If necessary, the senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for
the purpose of considering judicial appointments. The appointment shall
be effective, unless rejected by a majority vote of all members of the
senate. If the senate rejects the appointment, the o ffic e shall be
considered vacant and a new nominating process shall commence.
Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness for
o ffic e without regard to any partisan political considerations.
Sec. 9. Each judicial appointee of a court of record shall be subject to an
unopposed retention election at the first general election held more than
three years after appointment. Following initial voter approval, each
supreme court justice every tenth year, and each judge of other courts of

B38

32

record every sixth year, shall be subject to an unopposed retention
election at the corresponding general election.
Judicial retention
elections shall be held on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by
statute.
If geographic divisions are provided for any court of
record,judges of those courts shall stand for retention election only in the
geographic divisions to which they are selected. Judges of courts not of
record shall be selected in a manner, for a term, and with qualifications
provided by statute.

Explanation

The proposed article specifically provides for the method o f selecting judges
for all courts of record. The procedure includes the following components:
1.

Judicial Nominating Commissions - Legislative participation is strictly
prohibited. The nominating commissions would recommend three names
to the governor.

2.

Gubernatorial appointment - The Governor would make an appointment
from the nominating commission recommendations.

3.

Review by the senate - A majority vote would be necessary to reject a
nominee. In addition, the senate could call itself into session to review
judicial appointments.

4.

Uncontested retention elections - The initial retention election would be
held at the first general election three years after appointment.
Subsequent elections would be held at the conclusion of each term of
o ffice.

Under the proposal, the term of o ffice for supreme court justices is ten years
and the terms for judges of other courts of record judges is six years. These terms
are the same as those found in the present constitution. Partisan considerations are
prohibited as a basis of selection. Also included is a reference stating that if
geographic divisions are created for a court, judges will stand for retention election
only in their respective division. This position reaffirms existing practice.
The present constitution provides for the selection process to be set entirely
by statute. However, direct partisan involvement is prohibited. The scope of
legislative authority, however, has been limited through recent court decisions.

Rationale

One of the principal objectives of the Constitutional Revision Commission's
study of the Judicial A rticle was to provide a mechanism to attract and retain
quality individuals to serve in the judiciary. Due to the importance of this issue, the
Constitutional Revision Commission departed from its usual policy of legislative
flexibility and proposed a specific selection process to be included in the
constitution.
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The Constitutional Revision Commission carefully reviewed the experiences
and constitutions of other states, as well as the United States Constitution. The
selection process proposed by the Constitutional Revision Commission is based on
the following conclusions:
•The judicial selection process must balance the interests of the legislature,
the governor, the courts, and the public.
•Absent actionable behavior, selection to the bench contemplates a
permanent position. As such, judicial terms are longer than terms for other
political offices. (Note: The United States Constitution provides for the
lifetim e appointment of all federal judges.)
•Periodic public review is necessary to evaluate the performance of sitting
judges. However, that review should focus on the record of the judge and not
become a contest between personalities or parties.
•The selection process must balance the public's right to review with the
protection for the judiciary to render unpopular but legally correct decisions.
The commission feels that its proposal grants a meaningful, but not excessive,
role to both the legislature and the governor. Likewise, the public's right to
periodically evaluate judges is preserved. Lastly, the necessary protections are
maintained to preserve an independent judiciary.

Sec. 10 - Conflict of Interest
Present Language

There is no language in the present constitution establishing guidelines or
restrictions in the area of conflict of interest. Such restrictions, if any, are
provided by statute.

Proposed Language

Sec. 10. Supreme court justices, district court judges, and judges of all
other courts of record while holding o ffic e may not practice law, hold any
elective non-judicial public o ffic e or hold o ffic e in a political party.

Explanation

The private practice of law, holding elected public o ffice, and the holding
o ffic e in a political party are prohibited for judges by the proposed article.

Rationale

Most members of the judiciary expressed concern over the absence of such a
provision in the present constitution. For this reason, the commission inserted this
provision. It is similar to comparable language found in other state constitutions.
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Sec. 11 - Court Administration
Present Language

There is no present language in the constitution dealing directly with
administration of the judiciary. Sec. 7 does contain language authorizing
the district court to exercise supervisory authority over other "inferior
courts".
Sec. 7. . . . The District Courts or any judge thereof, shall have power to
issue. . . writs necessary to carry into e ffe c t their orders, judgments and
decrees, and to give them a general control over inferior courts and
tribunals within their respective jurisdictions.
Sec. 14. The Supreme Court shall appoint a clerk, and a reporter of its
decisions, who shall hold their offices during the pleasure of the Court.
Until otherwise provided, Court Clerks shall be ex o ffic io clerks of the
District Courts in and for their respective counties, and shall perform
such other duties as may be provided by law.

Proposed Language

Sec. 11. A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt rules for the
administration of the courts of the state. The Judicial Council shall
consist of the chief justice of the supreme court, as presiding officer, and
such other justices, judges and other persons as provided by statute.
There shail be at least one representative on the Judicial Council from
each court established by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice
of the supreme court shall be the chief administrative o fficer for the
courts and shall implement the rules adopted by the Judicial Council.

Explanation

The proposed article specifically establishes a Judicial Council to be composed
of representatives from each level of the judiciary. The council would act as the
administrative body for the court with the chief justice as presiding officer.

Rationale
This section addresses the issue of whether or not there should be a central
administrative authority for the entire judicial branch of government.
The
commission determined that centralized authority would create a more efficien t and
e ffe c tiv e judicial administration. The proposal, therefore, establishes a single
judicial governing body, the Judicial Council, to represent all courts. The inclusion
of a representative from every court level would insure the participation of all
courts in the administrative process. In addition, placing the chief justice at the
head of the council focuses administrative and presiding authority in the senior
judicial o fficer of the state. The commission fe lt that the legislature should
determine the composition of the council (with limited guidelines) to ensure
maximum flexibility in developing an administrative body for the judiciary.
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Some questions arose over the administrative authority of the judicial council
and the rulemaking authority o f the supreme court. The commission fe lt that the
primary role of the council lies in developing basic administrative policies including
consolidated budgeting procedures, personnel systems, relations with other
governmental entities, and the management of judicial resources. The role of the
supreme court is to establish the actual adjudication procedures used by the courts.
In addition, the supreme court is specifically charged with the management of the
appeals process.

Sec. 12 - Judicial Conduct
Present Language

Sec. 11. Judges may be removed from o ffic e by the concurrent vote of
both houses of the Legislature, each voting separately; but two-thirds of
the members to which each house may be entitled must concur in such
vote. The vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of
the members voting for or against a judge, together with the cause or
causes of removal, shall be entered on the journal of each house. The
judge against whom the house may be about to proceed shall receive
notice thereof, accompanied with a copy of the cause alleged for his
removal, at least ten days before the day on which either house of the
Legislature shall act thereon.
Sec. 27. Any judicial o ffic e r who shall absent himself from the State of
district for more than ninety consecutive days, shall be deemed to have
forfeited his o ffice: Provided, That in case of extreme necessity, the
Governor may extend the leave of absence to such tim e as the necessity
therefor shall exist.
Sec. 28. The Legislature may provide uniform standards for mandatory
retirement and for removal of judges from o ffice.
Legislation
implementing this section shall be applicable only to conduct occurring
subsequent to the e ffe c tiv e date of such legislation. Any determination
requiring the retirement or removal of a judge from o ffic e shall be
subject to review, as to both law and facts, by the Supreme Court.
Proposed Language

Sec. 12. A Judicial Conduct Commission is established, which shall
investigate complaints against any justice or judge and conduct
confidential hearings concerning the removal or involuntary retirement of
a~justice or judge, th e legislature by statute shall provide for the'
composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission. On
recommendation of the Judicial Conduct Commission, the supreme court,
after a hearing, may censure, remove, or retire a justice or judge for
action which constitutes willful misconduct in o ffice, willful and
persistent failure to perform judicial duties, disability that seriously
interferes with the performance of judicial duties, or conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice which brings a judicial o ffic e into
disrepute. The power o f removal conferred by this section is alternative
to the power of impeachment.
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Explanation

Under this section, a Judicial Conduct Commission is established to review
complaints against judges and to conduct confidential hearings. The revision
provides the Judicial Conduct Commission with the authority to make
recommendations to the supreme court concerning discipline or the removal of
judges. The section also outlines the parameters of judicial misconduct and provides
that the composition and procedures of the commission shall be established by the
legislature. Other means of disciplining or removing judges have been deleted,
including the "removal by address" power of the legislature (Sec. 11), forfeiture of
o ffic e by absence (Sec. 27), and other statutory methods (Sec. 28). The provision
further provides that the method of discipline and removal used by the commission
is to be an alternative to the impeachment power which is provided in the
Legislative Article.

Rationale

The commission initially fe lt that specific standards of judicial conduct would
be best le ft to legislative determination. However, as alternative methods of
judicial discipline were reviewed, the commission discovered that most of these
methods were either vague regarding grounds for removal, or lacked a fundamental
regard for due process.This was particularly true regarding the "removal by address"
provision in Sec. i 1.
The commission concluded that the establishment of the Judicial Conduct
Commission was the best system and important enough to warrant constitutional
inclusion. The role of the legislature is still preserved with the impeachment power.

Sec. 13 - Judicial Compensation
Present Language

Sec. 12. The Judges of the Supreme and District Courts shall receive at
stated times compensation for their services, which shall not be
diminished during the terms for which they are selected.
Sec. 20. Until otherwise provided by law, the salaries of supreme and
district judges, shall be three thousand dollars per annum, and mileage,
payable quarterly out of the State treasury.

Proposed Language

Sec. 13. The legislature shall provide for the compensation for all justices
and judges. The salaries of justices and judges shall not be diminished
during their terms of office.

Explanation

The proposed article provides for judicial compensation by statute and
prohibits diminution of judicial salaries during their terms of office.
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Rationale

Specific dollar amounts in the constitution were deleted because they unduly
restrict constitutional flexibility. In addition, the present language concerning
diminution of judicial salaries was retained to prevent political manipulation or
retribution on the part of the legislature and to help insure judicial independence.

Sec. 14 - Retirement and Removal From Office
Present Language

Sec. 28. The Legislature may provide uniform standards for mandatory
retirement and for removal of judges from o ffic e .
Legislation
implementing this section shall be applicable only to conduct occurring
subsequent to the e ffe c tiv e date of such legislation. Any determination
requiring the retirement or removal of a judge from o ffic e shall be
subject to review, as to both law and facts, by the Supreme Court.
This section is additional to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal
of justices and judges provided in Sections 11 and 27 of this article.

Proposed Language

Sec. 14. The legislature may provide standards for
retirement of justices and judges from office.

the mandatory

Explanation

The proposed article permits the legislature to provide standards for the
mandatory retirement of judges. There is little change from the present language as
it relates to judicial retirement. However, the term "uniform" has been deleted.
The commission has substituted the Judicial Conduct Commission (Sec. 12) for the
legislative authority regarding judicial removal standards. Supreme court review of
removal actions is also included in Sec. 12.

Rationale

The commission saw no need to substantially change this section as it relates
to mandatory judicial retirement standards. The commission deleted the term
"uniform" because it fe lt that the legislature should be free to set different
retirement standards for the judges of the various courts.

Sec. 13 - County Attorneys
Present Language

Sec. 10. A county attorney shall be elected by the qualified voters of
each county who shall hold his o ffice for a term of four years. The
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powers and duties of county attorneys, and such other attorneys for the
state as the legislature may provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all
cases where the attorney for any county, or for the state, fails or refuses
to attend and prosecute according to law, the court shall have power to
appoint an attorney pro tempore.

:i

Proposed Language

Sec. 15 . The legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors
who shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such
other duties as may be provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be
selected in a manner provided by statute and shall be admitted to
practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute,
the supreme court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.

n
D
o

Explanation

The section deletes specific reference to county attorneys and establishes a
system of public prosecutors. The prosecutors would be selected as provided by
statute. A requirement that public prosecutors be qualified to practice law is also
included. The section retains the authority to appoint prosecutors pro tempore, but
clarifies that the supreme court is to be the appointing authority.

D

Rationale

0

The commission fe lt that requiring each county to elect a county attorney was
unduly restrictive and precluded the establishment of other prosecutorial structures
such as district attorneys. The proposal requires the legislature to establish a
system of professionally competent public prosecutors. The prosecutors would be
selected as provided by statute. The commission fe lt that since there are legitim ate
reasons for requiring elected as well as appointed prosecutors, the legislature should
be free to set public policy in this area.

Miscellaneous Provisions

The following sections of A rticle VIII were considered by the commission to be
unnecessary or outdated and were deleted from the proposal. In most cases, similar
provisions could be established by either court rule or statute.

0

D
u
D
D
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1.

Disqualification of Judges, Nepotism

u

Sec. 13. Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the supreme or
inferior courts shall preside in the trial of any cause where either of the
parties shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity within the
degree of first cousin, or in which he may have been of counsel, or in the
trial of which he may be presided in any inferior court.

D
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Sec. 15. No person related to any judge of any court by affinity or
consanguinity with the degree of first cousin, shall be appointed by such
court or judge to, or employed by such court or judge in any o ffic e or duty
in any court of which such judge may be a member.

Rationale

The essence of these provisions could be more appropriately retained by
statute or court rule.

2.

Style of Process—"The State of Utah"

Sec. 18. The style of all process shall be, "The State of Utah," and all
prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of the
same.

Rationale

This provision is a procedural requirement better stated by court rule.

3.

Forms of Civil Action

Sec. 19. There shall be but one form of civil action, and law and equity
may be administered in the same action.

Rationale

Although there are historical distinctions surrounding this provision,
importance is largely symbolic and could be stated by court rule.

4.

its

Judges to be Conservators of Peace

Sec. 21. Judges o f the Supreme Court, District Courts, and justices of the
peace, shall be conservators of the peace, and may hold preliminary
examinations in cases of felony.

Rationale

The language of this section is outdated and inconsistent with the rest of the
proposal.

5.

Judges to Report Defects in Law

Sec. 22. District Judges may, at any time, report defects and omissions in
the law to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court, on or before the
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first day of December of each year, shall report in writing to the
Governor any seeming defect or omission in the law.

Rationale

This provision is outdated and and could be stated by court rule.

6.

Publication of Decision, Supreme Court Decisions to be in Writing

Sec. 23. The legislature may provide for the publication of decisions and
opinions of the Supreme Court, but all decisions shall be free to publishers.

Rationale

This provision is outdated and not
requirements could be established by statute.

7.

needed

in

the

constitution.

The

Effect of Extending Judges' Terms

Sec. 24. The terms of o ffic e of Supreme and District Judges may be
extended by law, but such extension shall not a ffect the terms for which
any judge was elected.

Rationale

This provision was considered unnecessary.

8.

Decisions to be in Writing

Sec. 25. When a judgment or decree is reversed, modified or affirmed by
the Supreme Court, the reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in
writing, signed by the judges concurring, filed in the o ffic e of the clerk of
the Supreme Court, and preserved with a record of the case. Any judge
dissenting therefrom, may give the reasons o f his dissent in writing over
his signature.

Rationale

The commission is generally supportive of the concept of written court
opinions. However, it fe lt that a rigid constitutional mandate was unnecessary.
This same requirement could easily be imposed by statute or court rule. It should be
noted that the present language applies only to the supreme court. As such, no
similar constitutional requirement exists regarding decisions by other courts, even
when functioning in an appellate capacity. Also, no similar provision is contained in
the U.S. Constitution.
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9.

Court to Prepare Syllabus
Sec. 26. It shall be the duty of the court to prepare a syllabus of all the
points adjudicated in each case, which shall be concurred in by a majority
of the judges thereof, and it shall be prefixed to the published reports of
the case.

Rationale

This requirement was considered unnecessary for inclusion in the constitution
and could be stated by statute.

Section 2 - Transition Provision

Section 2. This amendment shall not shorten the term of o ffic e or abolish
the o ffic e of any justice of the supreme court, any judge of the district
court, or judge of any other court who is holding o ffic e of the e ffe c tiv e
date of this amendment. Justices and judges holding o ffic e on the
e ffe c tiv e date of this amendment shall hold their respective offices for
the terms for which elected or appointed and at the completion of their
current terms shall be considered incumbent officeholders. Existing
statutes and rules on the effe c tiv e date o f this amendment, not
inconsistent with it, shall continue in force and e ffe c t until repealed or
changed by statute.

Rationale

This section is included as part of the amendment resolution, but is not part of
the actual Judicial Article. The section is intended to ensure a smooth transition
after the approval of the amendment and to protect sitting judges. Specifically,
judges holding o ffic e on the effe c tiv e date of the amendment are considered
incumbent officeholders and therefore not subject to reappointment. A t the
completion of their term, they would stand for a retention election as provided in
the Judicial Article.
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